Introduction
Channeling funds from savers to firms is one of the central problems facing an economy. In a frictionless world with widely-dispersed and reliable information, financial assets are perfect substitutes, and are allocated independently of existing financial markets and intermediaries. In this case, the institutional structure of the financial system is merely a veil. Recent research casts serious doubt on this frictionless model because of implausible assumptions about the availability and quality of information. In the presence of asymmetric information, financial structure has major impacts on the allocation of funds, the pace of capital formation, and the performance of the economy. 1 When lenders and firms face significant information asymmetries that create possibilities for opportunism by better-informed firms, banks may play an important role in financing and governing firms. Owing to economies of scale and scope, banks are arguably well-positioned to finance and monitor firms. Germany is the prototypical economy where universal banks, which offer a wide-range of financial services, allegedly exert substantial influence over firms, and thus Germany is ideal for studying bank-firm relations and bank intermediated finance. 2 The current study extracts testable implications from the German Bank Influence Model (GBIM), and evaluates these hypotheses empirically.
The widely-held view of German bank influence has three major 1 For surveys of parts of this voluminous literature, see Bernanke (1993) , Brennan (2001) , Hellwig (1991) , and Hubbard (1998) . 2 Banks are important in two other G-7 countries --France and Japan. Germany is the preferred country to explore bank influence because the role of banks is more dominant than in France. While banks play a substantial role in Japan, the use of bank finance "...has been largely a regulatory phenomenon" (Hodder and Tschoegl, 1992, p. 9) , and a bank can hold only 5% of a firm's equity (this limit was 10% prior to 1987). components: finance, control, and profitability (cf. Edwards and Fisher, 1994, Chapter 1). German banks allegedly supply finance relatively cheaply because of technical expertise and superior information. The latter follows from bank representation on firms' supervisory boards and long-term relations between banks and firms. The second component of German bank influence is that banks reduce managerial agency costs associated with corporate control. The superior information that lowers finance costs also permits banks to monitor management effectively. In addition to representation on supervisory boards, banks have substantial voting power obtained either directly through ownership or indirectly through proxies, borrowings, or investment companies. Consolidated voting power, supervisory board representation, and long-term relations combine to provide banks with the potential to substantially influence firms. German banks thus would appear to have the power to solve the agency problem at the core of the corporate control dilemma and, with large ownership stakes, the incentive to exercise control. In turn, lower finance costs for external funds and lower agency costs of corporate control have a favorable effect on firm profitability, the third component of the GBIM.
While these arguments are certainly reasonable, and perhaps even persuasive, alternative perspectives exist, and the GBIM needs to be evaluated empirically. Several studies have pointed to positive roles that banks play in the success of the German system of investment finance. This confidence has not gone unchallenged. Deeg (1992, p. 3) argues that "the capacity of the German banks to influence the decisions of non-financial firms and coordinate the activities of industry is significantly more circumscribed than is widely assumed..." Wenger (1992 and with Kaserer, 1998) has written extensively on the deleterious effects of German banks. Perlitz and Seger (1994) and Seger (1997) find a negative influence of banks on firm performance. In a recent and important book, Edwards and Fischer (1994, p. 240) conclude that "The commonly-held view of the merits of the German system of finance for investment, in terms of the supply of external finance to firms and corporate control, receives no support from the analysis of available evidence." However, most existing empirical work on Germany is based on relatively aggregate data or single cross-sections. In her review of Edwards and Fischer's book, Elston (1995) notes that much of the debate on the merits of the bank-based vs. market-based finance has stagnated simply due to lack of detailed empirical evidence. Gorton (1995) expresses a similar concern, and calls for the use of firmlevel cross sections to assess the influence of German banks. Studies based on cross-tabulations of aggregate financial data, while informative, can not capture the complexities affecting financing choices. There are many non-bank factors that vary across firms and influence financing decisions. Failing to control for these factors can seriously bias inferences based on aggregated data. Thus, microdata are needed to assess the nature and extent of German bank influence.
This paper presents such a microeconomic inquiry by extracting testable implications from the GBIM. Section 2 describes the financial statement and ownership data for German firms. These panel data are transformed into a crosssection, and we discuss the econometric reasons for focusing on cross-section information.
The finance, control, and profitability hypotheses are examined in Sections 3-5 in terms of three questions: 1) do bank influenced firms enjoy lower finance costs?; 2) is bank influence a solution to control problems?; 3) do bank influenced firms have higher profitability? Apart from a standard regression analysis, we also use Leamer's Extreme Value Analysis to assess the fragility/sturdiness of our inferences and to address concerns about multicollinearity and equation specification. We find that bank influence is not associated with a reduction of finance costs nor a change in profitability. Our empirical evidence offers little support for the GBIM. Rather a view of bank relations emerges where banks provide corporate control services and are compensated by charging higher rates for borrowed funds and fees for a variety of other banking services. As discussed in Section 6, bank influence seems to serve as a substitute control mechanism, one of several available for addressing corporate control problems that does not appear to offer any net advantage to firms. This inquiry should be viewed as exploratory for several reasons. The GBIM is a collection of plausible economic relations and behavioral responses, but is not based on a fully articulated model of optimizing agents constrained by information and agency problems and market forces. Thus, we are reporting some interesting conditional correlations, not identifying deep structural links.
Moreover, we have not accounted for the possible endogeneity of bank affiliations. As emphasized by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) , control mechanisms may be selected on the basis of particular characteristics of firms and their governance problems. While we control for several of these factors, we can not entirely discount the possibility of endogeneity bias. Notwithstanding these concerns, explicit testing of the GBIM will be useful in generating a dialogue between empirical results and theoretical models. Indeed, some of the testable propositions require auxiliary assumptions that have not been fully appreciated in the literature. The goal of the current paper is to begin to develop micro-based empirical evidence that will inform views of corporate finance and governance problems and the possibly ameliorative role of close bank relations.
The Data
An important innovation in the current study is the unique data used to examine bank influence in Germany. Data are available for 91 firms (a listing is presented in the Appendix), and are drawn from financial statements and measures of ownership concentration. These data are described in the first two sub-sections.
The final two sub-sections discuss the transformation of the data and sample characteristics.
The Bonn Database
The Bonn Database contains financial information on German industrial corporations quoted on the German stock exchange. BANKDEBT' = Long-term bank debt (maturities ≥ five years) not secured by mortgages divided by long-term debt (maturities ≥ five years). DIVIDENDS = Dividends on common and preferred equity divided by TOTALASSETS (multiplied by 100). FIXED = Fixed assets less depreciation divided by TOTALASSETS. GROWTH = Investment in fixed assets divided by the replacement cost of fixed assets. ICOVERAGE = The inverse of the coverage ratio (cash flow divided by total interest expenses, with cash flow defined as beforetax income plus depreciation). LEVERAGE = The book value of all of the firm's liabilities (long-term, maturities ≥ five years; medium-term, maturities ≥ one year but < five years; and short-term, maturities < one year) divided by TOTALASSETS.
LT-DEBT = Long-term debt (maturities ≥ five years) divided by TOTALASSETS.
MARKET/BOOK = The market value of equity (the number of shares outstanding at the end of the year multiplied by the year end share price) divided by the book value of equity.
NET LT-DEBT = Net long-term debt, LT-DEBT -BANKDEBT. PROFITABILITY = Return on assets, equal to net income (after pension payments but before taxes) and interest expense both divided by TOTALASSETS (multiplied by 100). SIZE = An indicator variable ranging from 1 (smallest) to 4 (largest) defined by quartiles of TOTALASSETS. TOTALASSETS = The book value of all of the firm's assets less depreciation on fixed assets less Qualifying Reserves, stated in billions of Deutsche Marks. VOLATILITY = The standard deviation of cash flow (defined as before-tax income plus depreciation) divided by the mean of cash flow (i.e., the coefficient of variation of cash flow). is an indicator variable measuring direct ownership by a financial institution, and is defined as follows: BI equals 1 if a national bank or a national insurance company a) holds more than 25% of the outstanding shares and no other owner holds more than 25% or b) holds more than 50% of the outstanding shares; 0 otherwise (i.e., BI equal 1 when a national bank or national insurance company holds a majority or plurality (in excess of 25%) of the outstanding shares).
Bank Influence And Ownership Concentration

Under
German corporate law, a 25% share of voting rights is sufficient to block any major proposal at the shareholders meeting.
We can also classify the 91 firms by ownership concentration, and define the following indicator variable: CONCENTRATION equals 1 if a) a single stockholder holds more than 50% of the shares or b) a limited number (two or three) of stockholders together hold more than 75% of the shares; 0 otherwise.
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Note that CONCENTRATION is defined inclusive of financial institution 4 The data did not permit separation of banks from other financial institutions. These direct ownership data are available for each year, and hence the ownership characteristic can vary over the sample, though the variation is limited. The financial institution is identified with the category in which it appears most frequently over the sample.
5 Firms are classified into one of the following six mutually exclusive categories in the original data: a) a single stockholder holds more than 75% of the shares; b) several (two or three) stockholders together hold more than 75% of the shares; c) a single stockholder holds more than 50% of the shares; d) several (two or three) stockholders together hold more than 50% of the shares; e) a single stockholder holds more than 25% of the shares; f) there exists no stockholder holding more than 25% of the shares. These ownership concentration data are available for each year, and hence the concentration characteristic of a firm can vary over the sample. The firm is identified with the category in which it appears most frequently over the sample. The indicator variable is defined as follows: CONCENTRATION = 1 if category a), b), or c) is applicable; CONCENTRATION = 0 otherwise.
ownership; consequently, a firm could be both concentrated and bank influenced.
Data Transformation
The questions motivating this study focus on long-run differences between firms with and without bank affiliations, and hence are cross-section in nature.
However, since there is variation in both the cross-section and time dimensions, one is tempted to exploit all of this variation by pooling the data and estimating a fixed-effects model. Two reasons suggest resisting this temptation. First, since bank influence changes very little over time, behavioral responses to bank influence can be identified only in the cross-section. Second, using the available time variation would necessitate specifying the temporal dynamics of the financial variables. While these dynamics are interesting in their own right, they raise specification issues that may bias estimates of the parameters of interest in this study. For example, if firms smooth earnings, then annual earnings will be a misleading measure of period t profitability; the averaging procedure used here is unaffected by this intertemporal distortion. Several of these points have been considered formally by Pesaran and Smith (1995) in a random coefficients framework with exogenous regressors. These authors establish three important properties of coefficients estimated from a cross-section model: 1) they represent the long-run average effects; 2) they are consistent for large T; and 3) they are robust to misspecification of dynamics in the underlying micro model.
Furthermore, even when the model is correctly specified, they show that the fixedeffects model generates inconsistent estimates. Thus, several considerations suggest a cross-section analysis of the dataset, and all of the data have been averaged along the time dimension. Based on these considerations, the direct finance hypothesis is tested with the following Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) specification, 
Sample Characteristics
BANKDEBT = Φ[BI: Z F ] + ε ,(1)
Empirical Results
We begin to test the direct finance hypothesis by OLS estimates of (1).
Column 1 of Table 2 contains results with our measure of bank influence and the full set of conditioning variables. Focusing on coefficients statistically significant at conventional levels, we see that bank debt is higher for concentrated firms and firms with more volatile cash flow. The BI coefficient central to our evaluation of the GBIM is negative but statistically close to zero.
The results for BI can be sensitive to the conditioning variables included in the regression, and three further tests are undertaken. First, columns 2 presents results where the conditioning variables insignificant at the 10% level in the initial regressions are removed. In these restricted regressions, the coefficient on BI remains negative and statistically and economically insignificant. Second, the above results allow only the constant term to shift in response to bank influence. By interacting BI with the conditioning variables, we can allow both the constant term and slope coefficients to differ for bank influenced firms, and we estimate the following model,
(1')
The statistical significance of the interaction variables, BI*Z F is assessed by an Ftest, and the p-values (Ω) reported in Table 2 indicate that the bank influence variable is statistically insignificant in both regressions. Alternatively, the economic significance of the interaction variables can be assessed by calculating Γ, the percentage change in BANKDEBT when an independent firm becomes affiliated with a bank (and vice versa for bank affiliated firms). If bank influence leads to a substantially favorable shift in the supply curve of bank loans, Γ will be positive and large. Instead of an outward movement, bank influence leads to a large inward shift of the supply curve, and existing loans decline substantially.
Our micro-data evidence complements the findings of Corbett and Jenkinson (1998 , Table 1 ) and Mayer (1990, Table 12. 3), who show with aggregate data that Germany utilizes less bank debt than most other industrialized countries. Taken together, these results from micro and aggregate datasets raise the question as to which characteristics define a bank-based economy.
Third, the above procedures are two of several ways to conduct specification searches. However, inquisitive (cynical?) readers may be left wondering whether there is some other combination of correlated regressors that 9 See the notes to Table 2 for details about the computation of Γ.
might alter inferences. The structure of our research problem permits us to address this skepticism straightforwardly. The direct finance hypothesis only concerns the BI coefficient. While some of the conditioning variables may be important determinants of bank loans, the actual combination is unimportant for the hypothesis of interest. Applying the Extreme Value Analysis (EVA) proposed by Leamer (1983) , we estimate (1) The results from the EVA presented in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 corroborate the above findings. The statistics for the distribution of estimated These results are at odds with the GBIM, and suggest alternative interpretations of the bank influence/lending relation. Rajan (1992) and Sharpe (1990) have argued that the ex-post information monopoly (relative to alternative lenders) provides banks a substantial bargaining advantage that may be difficult to guard against ex-ante. In this situation, banks "holdup" firms with which they are associated, loan rates rise, and loan volume falls. Portfolio considerations further suggest that a bank with a substantial stake in a firm's equity may want to attenuate its exposure by issuing less debt to that firm. Either of these alternative scenarios implies that, ceteris paribus, the BI coefficient in (1) will be negative.
A third scenario suggests that the GBIM is valid but that our test based on 14 the ratio of bank debt to total assets may be misleading.
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The problem occurs because bank influence can also lower the cost of equity. In this case, the firm's capital structure would be tilted away from debt in general and, as in Table 2 , we would expect to see a negative relation between BANKDEBT and BI. We can account for this lower equity cost effect by defining BANKDEBT' as the ratio of bank debt to total debt. Results are presented in columns 5 and 6 of Table 2, and give some mild support to the equity cost hypothesis. The BI coefficients in columns 5 and 6 are slightly more positive (or less negative) than the comparable coefficients in columns 1 and 2, respectively. Nonetheless, the coefficients remain statistically close to zero.
In sum, the evidence in Table 2 provides no support for the proposition that bank affiliation directly lowers the cost of finance, and hence no support for the direct finance hypothesis associated with the GBIM.
Indirect
Testable Implications
A bank relation can also lower a firm's finance costs indirectly through a certification effect. Evaluating business fundamentals and monitoring firm performance entail substantial fixed costs. For most creditors, these costs are high (relative to the return on investible funds), and extending credit in a prudent fashion becomes unprofitable. However, bank affiliation can be a forceful signal of the firm's creditworthiness. Information advantages (through supervisory board representation and long-term relations), technical expertise, and direct ownership stakes enable banks to generate credible signals about a firm's creditworthiness.
In the United States, James (1987) and Lummer and McConnell (1989) establish that an announcement of a new bank loan or a bank line of credit has a greater positive effect on the firm's stock price than an announcement of an alternative 10 We thank one of our reviewers for suggesting this scenario.
source of credit.
Certification lowers the cost of external funds, and is most likely to be evident for credits with lengthy maturities. If the GBIM is valid, we would expect bank influenced firms to have higher proportions of long-term debt, net of bank debt, on their balance sheets. The indirect finance hypothesis is evaluated by the coefficients on BI in the following OLS specifications,
+ where NET LT-DEBT equals long-term debt net of long-term bank debt divided by total assets and the conditioning variables (Z F ) are the same for both the direct and indirect finance hypotheses.
Empirical Results
The indirect financing hypothesis is examined in Table 3 , which reports OLS estimates of (2). As in Table 2 , column 1 utilizes the full set of conditioning variables, while column 2 uses only those conditioning variables significant initially. We find that NET LT-DEBT rises with MARKET/BOOK (as "winners" get funded more easily from outside sources) and SIZE (in accord with the consensus view noted by Harris and Raviv, 1991) , and falls with VOLATILITY (as the firm becomes more risky). The BI coefficients are negative and statistically close to zero.
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The Ω statistics indicate that, in regressions where BI interacts with the conditioning variables, these interactions are statistically insignificant. The EVA in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 confirms the difficulty in uncovering evidence supporting the GBIM, as the bank influence coefficient is always estimated imprecisely. The results in Table 2 indicate firmly that finance 11 If NET LT-DEBT is replaced by NET LEVERAGE (LEVERAGE less BANKDEBT), the coefficients on BI continue to be statistically close to zero. The only important difference is that the R 2 's double.
The Control Hypothesis
Testable Implications
The early corporate governance literature, as well as recent work on agency theory, has focused on the issues raised by widely-dispersed shareholdings in market-finance economies.
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The combined demands for huge sums of capital by firms and diversified portfolios by investors results in owners who usually possess little information, expertise, or incentive to monitor or discipline management.
Ideally, these agency problems between owners and managers are solved by a financial system with the proper incentives so that managers, while acting in their self-interest, behave consistent with the goals of the owners. With a widelydispersed ownership, creating such an incentive-compatible financial system is difficult because individual owners have little inducement to monitor management performance nor fund distressed firms. That is, free-rider problems loom large.
Unresolved agency problems, combined with the impossibility of writing contracts that cover all future possibilities, lead to corporate control problems (Hart, 1995) .
There are several institutional arrangements for achieving corporate control.
A hostile takeover by equity accumulation is one possibility. Roe (1994) , Sable, Griffin, and Deeg (1993) , and Zysman (1983) for historical overviews of the corporate governance literature from a political economy perspective, Roy (1997) for a critique of the economic efficiency approach from a sociological perspective, Lindberg, Campbell, and Hollingsworth (1991) for an analytic framework that combines the insights from many different social science disciplines, Hart (1995) for a theoretical overview of corporate governance issues in the context of financial economics, and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for a recent comprehensive survey of the corporate governance literature. 13 The effectiveness of hostile takeovers as a mechanism for corporate control has been questioned by empirical results for the United Kingdom (Franks and Mayer, 1996) and the United States (Martin and McConnell, 1991) . Stiglitz (1985) presents theoretical arguments that hostile takeovers are not an effective control mechanism in market-finance economies. He believes that banks through the issuance of debt may be more effective in achieving corporate control.
Barilla, this corporate control mechanism is used rarely in Germany. First, sufficiently concentrated ownership directly attenuates the free-rider problem, and creates incentives for owners to invest resources to address agency problems. Second, dividends can serve as a control device. For a given investment policy and cash flow, dividend payouts force management into external capital markets where control costs may be lower (Easterbrook, 1984) . Third, mandatory interest payments also reduce the scope of managerial discretion, and enhance control. As members of the supervisory board, banks appoint the management 14 Kester (1992, p. 95) reports that the wave of acquisitions in the late 1980's was due in large part to a preannounced capital gains tax increase for 1990. 15 The German and United Kingdom data on hostile takeovers are from Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001, p. 398) and Cosh and Guest (2001, p. 7) , respectively. The percentages are computed as the average number of takeovers divided by the average number of listed shares. The latter figure is difficult to estimate precisely because some listed firms are not subject to takeover due to, inter alia, their status as investment trusts (closed-end funds) or a sufficiently large ownership concentration that makes a hostile takeover virtually impossible. 16 The role of debt as a control device has been studied by, among others, Grossman and Hart (1982) , Raviv (1990), and Jensen (1986). board (Vorstand, whose members can not be members of the supervisory board). The combination of direct ownership, proxies, and other indirect ways of obtaining voting rights leads to a substantial consolidation of power. The overall proportion of voting rights exercised by banks at the 1992 shareholders meetings of the 24 largest widely held stock corporations ranged from 44%-99% and averaged 84%. Of this latter figure, 10% is due to investment companies, 13% to direct ownership, and 61% to proxies (Baums, 1996, p. 149) .
Consolidated voting power, supervisory board representation, and long-term relations would appear to provide German banks with the power to solve agency problems at the core of the corporate control dilemma and, with large ownership stakes, the incentive to exercise control.
If German bank influence is a substitute control mechanism, we should find, ceteris paribus, a negative relation between bank influenced firms and one or more of the other three mechanisms for exercising corporate control. Since bank influence is measured by a binary indicator variable, the control hypothesis is 18 In the 1970s, almost half of the total shares issued were deposited in such bank trustee accounts (Gessler Commission, 1979; Krummel, 1980) . In 1990, more than three-quarters of the value of domestic shares held outside the Bundesbank were in the custody of private banks (Smith, 1994, p. 359) .
19 Unlike open-end or closed-end mutual funds in the United States, German investment companies are corporations usually owned by universal banks, and the stocks in an investment company's portfolio are voted by the owners. Stock in a parent bank held in an investment company's portfolio can be voted at the parent bank's annual meeting and, in 1992, these votes were cast uniformly in support of the proposals favored by the parent bank's management. See Baums (1996, esp. 
Empirical Results
If bank influence is a mechanism for corporate control, then, ceteris paribus, it should be negatively associated with one or more of the variables representing other corporate control mechanisms. This aspect of the GBIM is examined in the probit equations presented in Table 4 . Two of the corporate control variables --DIVIDENDS and ICOVERAGE --are never statistically significant, even in regressions (not reported) in which either variable appears as the only corporate control variable.
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The results with CONCENTRATION, however, are striking and robust.
CONCENTRATION enters significantly negative in the models in the first two columns of Table 4 . The EVA in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 establishes the 20 However, if banks exercise control by increasing dividends or interest payments, a positive correlation between BI and DIVIDENDS or ICOVERAGE could emerge, and the negative effect of DIVIDENDS or ICOVERAGE could be masked. To explore this possible bias, we run regressions with DIVIDENDS or ICOVERAGE regressed against 1) BI and a constant, 2) BI and Z C , and 3) BI*Z C and Z C . The null hypothesis that the bank influence variable(s) has no effect is easily sustained. 21 sturdiness of this inference, as it is impossible (in a linear model) to obtain anything other than a negative sign on CONCENTRATION. Moreover, these coefficients are usually statistically significant at conventional levels. Table 4 suggests that bank influence is a substitute mechanism for controlling corporations.
CONCENTRATION also has an economically important impact on the probability of bank affiliation. We assess this impact by the change in a firm's probability of being bank influenced when its CONCENTRATION variable changes. These changes are represented by ∆+ , when CONCENTRATION changes from 0 to 1 for an unconcentrated firm, and ∆-, when CONCENTRATION changes from 1 to 0 for a concentrated firm.
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In column 1, the entry for ∆+ indicates that the probability of bank affiliation for the unconcentrated firms is initially 0.195 (the number in braces) and this probability falls sharply by -0.146 when CONCENTRATION is changed from 0 to 1. The entry for ∆-indicates that the sensitivity is approximately symmetric; for those firms who initially have concentrated ownership, the probability of bank affiliation rises by 0.166 when CONCENTRATION is changed from 1 to 0.
Our empirical results suggesting that bank influence is a substitute control mechanism may be challenged because of the substantial cross-shareholdings by non-financial corporations. Consider a situation where Firm A has a substantial ownership interest in Firm B, and Firm A has a widely-dispersed ownership. In our dataset, Firm B would be classified as concentrated, even though its ultimate ownership is dispersed. In reviewing the work of Schreyogg and Steinmann (1981) , Edwards and Fischer (1994, p. 189) conclude "...that the importance of non-financial enterprises as shareholders in Germany means that care is required when shareownership data are used to draw inferences about the significance of 21 See the notes to Table 4 for details about the computation of ∆+ and ∆− . corporate control problems in Germany." Fortunately, our dataset permits us to control for the effect of cross-shareholdings by non-financial corporations. We remove those firms for which a national enterprise holds a) more than 25% of the outstanding shares and no other owner holds more than 25% or b) more than 50% of the outstanding shares (i.e., those national enterprises holding a majority or plurality (in excess of 25%) of the outstanding shares). This exclusion reduces the number of observations from 91 to 58.
The EVA with the reduced samples is presented in columns 5 and 6 of Table 4 , and offers a dramatic confirmation of the corporate control hypothesis.
The mean of the distributions falls (in absolute value) from -0.689 to -0.557. As expected given the reduction in sample size, standard deviations rise. The distributions of t-statistics are shifted toward zero with the smaller samples. Most importantly, removing the effect of cross-shareholdings has no impact on the general conclusion to be drawn from the probit estimates --it is impossible to obtain anything other than a negative sign for any of the CONCENTRATION coefficients and these coefficients are frequently far from zero in a statistical sense.
In sum, our results point toward the interpretation that the control problems posed by the corporate form of organization are addressed by concentrated ownership or bank influence.
The Profitability Hypothesis
Testable Implications
The GBIM holds that there exists unique benefits associated with a bank relation. Lower charges for external finance and limits on managerial opportunism will enable firms, ceteris paribus, to earn greater profits. The profitability hypothesis is examined in terms of the following OLS specification,
+ where PROFITABILITY is return on assets, equal to net income (after pension payments but before taxes) and interest expense both divided by TOTALASSETS. This implication is based on several auxiliary assumptions that have not received attention in the literature. For firms in a competitive industry, a favorable shift in the long-run cost curve (due to an attenuation of finance and control problems) would increase the scale of operation but have no long-run impact on profitability. Thus, it is possible for the GBIM's finance and control channels to positively impact firms, but their effects may remain undetectable by profitability equations. To generate the prediction of a positive coefficient on BI in (4), we need to impose an auxiliary assumption about noncompetitive product or factor markets or other impediments permitting a sustained level of economic profits Independent of favorable financing and control outcomes and a noncompetitive market structure, firm profitability can be negatively related to bank influence for three very different reasons (which are not mutually exclusive).
First, the information advantage enjoyed by banks may permit them to exploit firms with which they are associated through excessive charges for borrowed funds or fees for a variety of services, such as underwriting securities, conducting trust and fiduciary businesses, and facilitating financial market transactions (Baums, 1993; Wenger, 1992) . Second, bank influence and firm profitability can be negatively associated because of a selection effect. Firms encountering financial difficulties may become affiliated with banks, and the relative profitability of bank influenced firms will be lower. Rather than pointing toward a deleterious role, this negative profitability effect may actually highlight a significant value of bank affiliation. Although the profitability test is somewhat ambiguous, a negative relation clearly 22 Seger (1997, Table 56 ) finds no evidence that bank influence is positively associated with poorly performing companies.
rejects the GBIM.
Empirical Results
The relation between profitability and bank influence is examined in Table   5 . These results for ownership concentration are related to the recent and important work on legal structures and corporate governance developed in a series of papers by La Porta, Shleifer, and Vishny. 23 In their framework, ownership concentration may enhance performance by reducing the managerial agency costs that arise with the separation of management and finance.
These costs are particularly likely to occur in Germany with its relatively weak legal protections of equity investors. However, it is also recognized that the private benefits of control may also rise with concentrated ownership to the detriment of firm performance. The results in Table 5 suggest either that ownership concentration does not convey the above benefit and cost or that they approximately cancel.
Summary and Conclusions
This study has examined the German Bank Influence Model (GBIM) with a unique dataset and a focus on the fragility/sturdiness of inferences. Three implications of the GBIM have been assessed.
First, do bank influenced firms enjoy lower finance costs? German banks allegedly supply finance relatively cheaply because of their technical expertise and superior information. In addition to this direct finance channel, we also examined a certification channel that may lower finance costs indirectly. Our results suggested that finance costs are not lower for firms affiliated with banks.
Second, is bank influence a solution to control problems? By combining superior information and consolidated power, banks are allegedly well-positioned to consult, monitor or discipline management. A sizeable equity stake may create substantial incentives to exercise corporate control. Bank influence and concentrated ownership were negatively related, which suggested that they are substitute means for controlling corporations.
Third, do bank influenced firms enjoy higher profitability? The favorable financing and control outcomes associated with the GBIM implies a favorable shift in the long-run cost curve and an increase in profitability provided the firms operate in noncompetitive markets. This hypothesis is not supported in the current study. In contrast to Cable (1985) , Gorton and Schmid (2000) , and Lehmann and
Weigand (2000), we do not find a significant positive relation between bank influence and profitability.
Our empirical results do not lend much support to the GBIM and, while deep structural links have not been uncovered, they permit us to draw a preliminary sketch of an alternative model of the German system of corporate control (though additional interpretations are possible). Control dilemmas are omnipresent, and firm owners address this problem by choosing a concentrated ownership structure or a bank affiliation (Table 4) .
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Banks must be compensated for the resources employed in creating value for their client firms. Such compensation can take the form of fees for various services or charges for borrowed funds that are above market levels. The empirical results in Table 2 indicate that bank affiliated firms do not hold greater amounts of bank debt, and these weakly negative relations are compatible with the following scenario: the firm participates in a loan market substantially controlled by its primary bank, the bank offers its profit-maximizing price of debt, and bank affiliated firms respond by borrowing less than independent firms facing lower loan rates. Relatively expensive bank interest charges and service fees survive in equilibrium because of the compensating benefits from the resolution of control problems enhancing economic performance. On balance, there is no net effect on profitability relative to independent firms (Table 5) as the benefits of control are counterbalanced by the inflated costs of banking services.
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This equilibrium is sustainable provided banks continue to be effective monitors, a role that has been questioned recently because of several prominent failures of corporate control.
The results presented in this study and the above sketch of the German system of finance and control suggests several directions for future research. Demsetz and Lehn (1985, United States) and Prowse (1992, Japan) have shown that ownership patterns respond to the economic incentives for control. Our finding on corporate control substitutability raises the further question as to which policy and non-policy factors determine the type of control mechanism used in 24 This conclusion is consistent the evidence in Kaplan (1994) , who finds that, for German firms, the relation between management board turnover and firm performance is independent of bank affiliation. He concludes that "...one plausible explanation is that all firms are subject to similar monitoring technologies" (p. 144).
25 A similar conclusion about bank-firm relations in Japan is reached by Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) .
Germany.
An additional issue is the purported role played by banks assisting firms in financial distress. This important function has been documented by Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990) 
Appendix: List Of The 91 German Firms Drawn From The Bonn Database
The number in column 1 is the firm's identifier in this list. The number in column 2 is the firm's identifier in the Bonn Database. Quartiles are determined by TOTALASSETS; the fourth quartile contains one fewer firm.
BANKDEBT is long-term bank debt (maturities ≥ five years) not secured by mortgages divided by TOTALASSETS. BANKDEBT' is long-term bank debt (maturities ≥ five years) not secured by mortgages divided by long-term debt (maturities ≥ five years). DIVIDENDS is dividends on common and preferred equity divided by TOTALASSETS (multiplied by 100). FIXED is fixed assets less depreciation divided by TOTALASSETS. GROWTH is investment in fixed assets divided by the replacement cost of fixed assets. ICOVERAGE is the inverse of the coverage ratio (cash flow divided by interest expenses, with cash flow defined as before-tax income plus depreciation). LEVERAGE is the book value of all of the firm's liabilities (Long-Term, maturities ≥ five years; Medium-Term, maturities ≥ one year but < five years; and Short-Term, maturities < one year) divided by TOTALASSETS. LT-DEBT is long-term debt (maturities ≥ five years) divided by TOTALASSETS. MARKET/BOOK is the market value of equity (the number of shares outstanding at the end of the year multiplied by the year end share price)
divided by the book value of equity. NET LT-DEBT is LT-DEBT less BANKDEBT.
PROFITABILITY is return on assets, equal to net income (after pension payments but before taxes) and interest expense both divided by TOTALASSETS (multiplied by 100).
TOTALASSETS is the book value of all of the firm's assets less depreciation on fixed assets less Table 1 . Estimated coefficients are reported in the table; standard errors are in parentheses and are heteroscedastic consistent using the technique of White (1980) with a bias correction (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993, pp. 552-554, equation HC2) . RSS is the residual sum of squares. The remaining two entries are based on the following OLS regression model that permits both the constant term and slope coefficients to differ for bank influenced firms: (1980) with a bias correction (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993, pp. 552-554, equation HC2) . RSS is the residual sum of squares. The remaining two entries are based on the following OLS regression model that permits both the constant term and slope coefficients to differ for bank influenced firms: NET LT-DEBT = Φ[BI*Z Column 4 contains the same statistics for the distribution of the associated t-statistic. Tables 2, 3 uses the full set of conditioning variables; column 2 uses those conditioning variables significant at the 10% level in the initial regression. Column 5 uses the full set of conditioning variables except for CONCENTRATION. Column 6 uses the full set of conditioning variables, but excludes BI. All variables are described in Table 1 . Estimated coefficients are reported in the table; standard errors are in parentheses and are heteroscedastic consistent using the technique of White (1980) with a bias correction (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993, pp. 552-554, equation HC2) . RSS is the residual sum of squares. The remaining two entries are based on the following OLS regression model that permits both the constant term and slope coefficients to differ for 
